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Sales Made to Out-of-State Purchasers Picked up at
a Pennsylvania Facility are Not Pennsylvania Sales
for Purposes of the Pennsylvania Corporate Net
Income Tax: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
Gilmour Manufacturing Company
CORPORATE TAXATION - ALLOCATION AND APPORTIONMENT -
SALES FACTOR - DOCK SALES MADE TO OUT-OF-STATE
PURCHASERS - The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
sales of tangible personal property made to out-of-state purchasers
who choose to pick up the property at a Pennsylvania seller's load-
ing dock are not includable in the numerator of the seller's sales
factor for the purpose of calculating the apportionment ratio used
in determining the seller's Pennsylvania corporate net income tax
liability.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gilmour Manufacturing Com-
pany, 822 A.2d 676 (Pa. 2003)
Gilmour Manufacturing Company ("Gilmour") is a lawn and
garden manufacturer located in Somerset, Pennsylvania.1 Gil-
mour sells lawn and garden equipment throughout the United
States, usually shipping via common carriers.! Gilmour typically
provides its purchasers a freight discount on the sale of its prod-
ucts if the purchaser picks up the merchandise at Gilmour's dock
in Pennsylvania.3 In most cases, Gilmour is aware of the final
destination of these out-of-state dock sales.4
During 1991, Gilmour sold its products to customers both inside
and outside of Pennsylvania.5 Gilmour's sales included out-of-
state dock sales totaling almost $2,400,000.6 Gilmour filed its
1991 Pennsylvania Corporate Net Income Tax Return by exclud-
1. Commonwealth v. Gilmour Mfg. Co., 822 A.2d 676, 677 (Pa. 2003).
2. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 677. In the case of transportation through common carriers,
Gilmour pays the freight charges for the shipping. Id.
3. Id. Sales made to purchasers who pick up the merchandise at the seller's dock and
move it outside of the state are referred to as "dock sales." Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Neither party disputes that Gilmour Manufacturing was entitled to apportion
its business income based on its multi-state activity. Id.
6. Id. at 677-78.
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ing these dock sales from its sales factor in the apportionment
ratio when computing its Pennsylvania income tax liability.8
The Pennsylvania Department of Revenue ("Department") re-
computed Gilmour's Pennsylvania tax liability.9 Relying on its
own regulation," the Department recalculated the apportionment
ratio to include the dock sales as sales occurring inside Pennsyl-
vania."
Gilmour paid the settled tax and filed a petition for refund with
the Board of Finance and Revenue ("Board").12 The Board denied
7. The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which equals the total dollar sales
made in Pennsylvania, and the denominator of which equals the total dollar sales made
everywhere. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(15) (West 1971). The sales factor, when
combined with a property factor and a payroll factor, is multiplied by taxable income to
arrive at the taxable income in Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(9)(A)
(West 1971).
8. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 677.
9. Id. The Pennsylvania Department of Revenue enforces the corporate net income
tax. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7408(a) (West 1971). The corporate net income tax is a self-
assessed tax; the taxpayer computes and pays the tax before a deadline. CHARLES L.
POTTER, JR. ET AL., 2003 GuIDEBOOK TO PENNSYLVANIA TAXES 350 (2002). The Department
of Revenue settles each return by either accepting the tax as reported or recomputing the
tax by making adjustments. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7407(a) (West 1971). The Depart-
ment of the Auditor General then reviews the settlement. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 802(a)
(West 1971). The taxpayer must receive notification of settlement within 18 months of the
date the return filing was due (or the date filed, if an extension was granted), or the tax-
payer's report must be accepted as filed. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7407(a) (West 1971).
10. The Department of Revenue has the authority to promulgate regulations, interpret-
ing statutory law, as part of its duty of enforcing the Tax Reform Code. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, § 7408(a) (West 1971). The Department of Revenue's regulation at issue in Gilmour
states: "Sales of tangible personal property are in the state in which delivery to the pur-
chaser occurs." 61 PA. CODE § 153.26(b)(2) (2003) (emphasis added). Neither party dis-
puted that the products that Gilmour Manufacturing sold were tangible personal property.
Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 677. The Department's regulation also provided an example that
stated that a New York producer selling products to a Pennsylvania distributor, who picks
up the goods in New York and brings them back into Pennsylvania for resale, has delivered
its goods in New York and, therefore, has New York sales. 61 PA. CODE § 153.26(b)(2)
(2003). An example was later added to this regulation illustrating how dock sales are to be
treated. Id.
11. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 677.
12. Id. at 678. A taxpayer may petition for a refund of any taxes collected by the De-
partment of Revenue, including the corporate net income tax. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §
10003.1 (West 1971). In the case of a refund of a settlement, the petition for refund must
be filed within six months of the mailing date of the notice of settlement. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 72, § 10003.1(d) (West 1971). The Department of Revenue then has six months to re-
spond to the petition. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7253(c) (West 1971). Here, the Department
of Revenue denied Gilmour's petition for refund for almost $18,000 of tax calculated by
including dock sales in the sales factor in computing its corporate net income tax liability.
Gilmour Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 717 A.2d 619, 620 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (Gilmour I).
If dissatisfied with the result of the appeal to the Department of Revenue, the tax-
payer may appeal the decision to the Board of Finance and Revenue. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§10003.1(e) (West 1971). The taxpayer must file such an appeal within 90 days of the mail-
ing date of the Department's response to the taxpayer's petition. Id.
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Gilmour's petition, and Gilmour sought to have the Board's deci-
sion reviewed by the Commonwealth Court. 3 Gilmour argued
that the Department of Revenue's regulation was inconsistent
with the Tax Reform Code, and, therefore, should not govern the
taxability of Gilmour's dock sales. 4
The Commonwealth Court, in an opinion authored by Judge
Smith, analyzed the language of the Tax Reform Code defining the
location of sales.'5 The statute in question reads: "Sales of tangi-
ble personal property are in this State if the property is delivered
or shipped to a purchaser, within this State regardless of the f.o.b.
point or other conditions of the sale."'6 Gilmour argued that the
phrase "within this State" modified the term "purchaser."' Under
Gilmour's interpretation, the sale is an in-state sale only if the
purchaser's ultimate destination is Pennsylvania. 8 The Pennsyl-
vania Department of Revenue, however, argued that the phrase
modified the term "delivered."9 The Department's interpretation
leads to an in-state sale if the actual delivery occurs inside the
state borders, regardless of the ultimate destination of the goods. 0
13. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 678. A taxpayer has 30 days from the date of the Board of
Finance and Revenue's decision to appeal to the Commonwealth Court. 210 PA. CODE R.
1571. Appeals can be made from the decisions of the Commonwealth Court, but the appel-
lant must first file exceptions to the Commonwealth Court decisions in order to be heard by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 210 PA. CODE R. 1571(e). Gilmour Manufacturing
timely filed an appeal to the Commonwealth Court, filed exceptions to the decision, and
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 678. See also Gilmour
1, 717 A.2d 619; Gilmour Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 750 A.2d 948 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)
(en banc) (Gilmour II).
14. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 678. The Pennsylvania Department of Revenue is given
statutory authority to interpret the Tax Reform Code and introduce regulations necessary
to facilitate the enforcement of those provisions. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7408(a) (West
1971). See also Philadelphia Suburban Corp. v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Fin. and Revenue, 635
A.2d 116 (Pa. 1993). Because of this delegated authority, the Pennsylvania reviewing
courts may give deference to the regulations adopted by the Department. Gilmour I, 717
A.2d at 621. See also Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Uniontown Area Sch.
Dist., 313 A.2d 156 (Pa. 1973). However, the interpretation of a statute is a question of
law; the courts may find the regulation in conflict with the legislature's statutory intention.
Gilmour I, 717 A.2d at 621.
15. Gilmour 1, 717 A.2d at 621.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(16) (West 1971) (emphasis added). F.O.B. is an
abbreviation for "free on board," a term used to establish the point at which the seller gives
title to the tangible personal property sold to the purchaser. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 678 n.2.
There are two types of f.o.b. points: delivery and destination. Title to the goods passes in
accordance with which point is used. See Shetzline v. C.&.M. Produce Co., 101 Pa. Super.
432 (1931).






Gilmour made three specific arguments to support its conten-
tion.21 Gilmour first contended that by placing the emphasis on
the word "delivered," the statute would contradict itself.22 The last
phrase of the statute insists that sales are Pennsylvania sales "re-
gardless of the f.o.b. point."23  If the phrase "within this State"
modifies delivery, as the Commonwealth challenged, then the last
phrase relating to f.o.b. points is extraneous. 24 Since Pennsylvania
has ruled that no provision is to be "mere surplusage,"25 Gilmour
argued that the phrase must be meaningful. 6 Gilmour concluded
that if the phrase is to have effect, then the regulation is in direct
conflict with the statute.27
Judge Smith did not respond directly to this argument.28 How-
ever, at this point of the opinion, she reminded the court that
regulations issued under the color of authority are entitled to def-
erence, unless clearly against legislative intent.29
Gilmour's second argument relied on the Florida Court of Ap-
peal's opinion in Florida Department of Revenue v. Parker Banana
Co.2 ° Parker Banana Company was a Florida corporation which
31
imported bananas and resold them to out-of-state consumers.
Parker Banana contended that sales to purchasers from outside of
the State of Florida were not Florida sales for purposes of comput-
ing the Florida apportionment ratio.32 Judge Danahy, writing for
the Florida court, interpreted the legislative intent surrounding
the apportionment statute in Florida to involve only taxing sales
made in the Florida market, determined by the ultimate destina-
tion of the goods.33
Judge Smith found the majority argument in Parker unpersua-
sive. 34  Although Gilmour argued that the language in the two
21. Gilmour I, 717 A-2d at 621-22.
22. Id. at 621.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(16) (West 1971).
24. Gilmour 1, 717 A.2d at 621.
25. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 679. See also 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903 (2003).




30. Id. This case is a case of first impression in Pennsylvania; therefore, Gilmour
Manufacturing introduced the opinions of several other jurisdictions to support its case.
Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 677, 680-81.
31. Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Parker Banana Co., 391 So. 2d 762, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980).
32. Parker, 391 So. 2d at 762.
33. Id.
34. Gilmour L 717 A.2d at 621.
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states' statutes was similar, Gilmour did not argue that both
states' legislatures had the similar legislative intents required to
compare the statutory interpretations.3 ' Looking to the Pennsyl-
vania statute, Judge Smith determined that the opportunity to
petition the Pennsylvania Secretary of Revenue for unfair appor-
tionment provisions supported the legislative intent to tax the
business activity of the taxpayer in Pennsylvania, as opposed to
focusing on the destination of the purchaser. 6
Gilmour's third argument looked at another Department regula-
tion, which reads: "Property shall be deemed to be delivered to a
purchaser within this Commonwealth if the shipment terminates
in this Commonwealth, even though the property is subsequently
transferred by the purchaser to another state."37 Gilmour con-
tended that this regulation illustrated an intent to implement a
destination test, which would be similarly applicable to the statute
at issue in Gilmour's case.3" Judge Smith disagreed with Gil-
mour's interpretation of the legislature's intent, determining that
the focus was on the sales activity of the taxpayer, not on the ac-
tivity of the purchaser or the purchaser's destination.39
Gilmour next cited a Minnesota case when it argued that the
overriding purpose of the sales factor in the CNI tax calculation
turns on destination as opposed to delivery.4 ° In Olympia Brewing
Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue,41 the taxpayer was selling beer to
out-of-state distributors who were picking up the beer in Minne-
sota at the taxpayer's warehouse.42 Olympia Brewing excluded all
out-of-state sales from its apportionment ratio for the taxable
year.43 The Minnesota Supreme Court compared Minnesota's
statute with the language and intent of the Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act ("UDITPA")." Finding that there
must be a difference between delivery and shipment, the Minne-
sota court refused to support a delivery test.45
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. See 61 PA. CODE § 153.26(b)(4)(i) (2003).
38. Gilmour 1, 717 A.2d at 621-22.
39. Id. at 622.
40. Id. The Minnesota case cited was Olympia Brewing Co. v. Comm'n of Revenue, 326
N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1982).
41. 326 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1982).
42. Olympia Brewing, 326 N.W.2d at 643.
43. Id. at 644.
44. Id. at 646. See discussion on UDITPA infra notes 121-136 and accompanying text.
45. Id. at 647.
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Judge Smith found this argument equally uncompelling, stating
that the Minnesota court did not adopt the destination test as a
result of examining the Minnesota statute, but rather determined
that delivery ended when the initial purchaser's location was de-
termined.46
Gilmour's final argument turned to the purposes and language
of the UDITPA.47 Gilmour argued that in order for state taxation
laws to be uniform, Pennsylvania must interpret the Pennsylvania
statute as other states have interpreted their statutes.48 Judge
Smith rejected this argument on two grounds.49  First, other
states, including Florida and Minnesota, have not in fact inter-
preted their respective statutes consistently. ° Also, Pennsylvania
has not adopted the UDITPA.5"
Judge Smith found that the legislative intent of the regulation
was to focus on the sales activity of Pennsylvania businesses, as
opposed to concerning itself with the final destination of ship-
ment. 2 She also noted at the end of her opinion that it is much
easier to determine the location of delivery than it is to determine
the location of a final destination point of a customer."3 Because
the regulation was neither found to be inconsistent with the stat-
ute nor unreasonable, the Board of Finance and Revenue's order
was affirmed.4
Gilmour filed exceptions with the Commonwealth Court, sitting
en banc, on Judge Smith's order.55 Judge Doyle, authoring the
majority opinion of the Commonwealth Court, analyzed two
sources of guidance on interpretation of the statute, which are the
regulations promulgated by the Department of Revenue and cases
from other jurisdictions interpreting similar language.56
Judge Doyle looked at Regulation Section 153.26, and analyzed
the courts ability to review whether the regulation followed the




50. Id. Gilmour also cited cases from Connecticut, Kentucky, California, and Wiscon-
sin. Id. These cases were not addressed by the Commonwealth Court; therefore, they are
not addressed here. Id.
51. Gilmour 1, 717 A.2d at 622 (citing Welded Tube Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 515
A.2d 988 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. Judge Doyle dissented, without opinion. Id.
55. Gilmour 11, 750 A.2d at 949.
56. Id. at 950.
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legislative intent of the corresponding statute; however, no solu-
tion was proposed based on this first source of guidance.57
The majority of Judge Doyle's opinion was spent discussing the
opinions of various jurisdictions." The first case the Common-
wealth Court analyzed was Olympia.9 After citing various por-
tions of the Olympia opinion at length, Judge Doyle agreed with
the proposition that the mode of transportation used when picking
up products at a seller's location should not be indicative of
whether the sale is an in-state or out-of-state sale. °
Judge Doyle conceded that Pennsylvania has not adopted the
UDITPA.61 However, the language used in the Pennsylvania stat-
ute is almost exactly that of the uniform act.62 Because the lan-
guage of the statute has been adopted almost verbatim from the
UDITPA, other jurisdictions' interpretations of similar statutes
can be persuasive.'
The Department of Revenue attempted to argue a delivery rule,
based on the delivery rule in effect for sales tax purposes.' Judge
Doyle found that following the Department's construction of the
statute allowed for different results depending on f.o.b. point,
which is clearly inconsistent with the statute.6 5
Judge Doyle continued his analysis by affirming that the pur-
pose of the Pennsylvania CNI tax is to measure the taxpayer-
seller's activity in the Pennsylvania market, as opposed to that of
the purchaser. 6' Therefore, he declared that including dock sales
to out-of-state purchasers in the numerator of the taxpayer's sales
57. Id. at 950-51.
58. Id. at 951-53.
59. Id. at 951.
60. Gilmour II, 750 A.2d at 951-52. Judge Doyle comments that similar results were
reached in the five other jurisdictions mentioned above. Id. at 952. See infra note 90 for
other jurisdictions.
61. Gilmour 11, 750 A.2d at 952 n.5.
62. Id. The Pennsylvania statute reads: "Sales of tangible personal property are in
this State if the property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, within this State regard-
less of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §
7401(3)2(a)(16) (West 1971). The UDITPA language states: "Sales of tangible personal
property are in this state if the property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than
the United States government, within this state regardless of the f.o.b. point or other condi-
tions of the sale." Uniform Division of Income Tax Purposes Act § 16(a). See discussion of
UDITPA infra notes 121-136 and accompanying text.
63. Id. "Statutes uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted and construed
to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact them."
1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1927 (2003).
64. Gilmour II, 750 A.2d at 952 (citing Commonwealth's brief at 17).
65. Id. See language of the Tax Reform Code supra note 61.
66. Gilmour 11, 750 A.2d at 953.
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factor would misrepresent the ratio of the Pennsylvania market to
the total of the taxpayer's sales."
Finally, Judge Doyle reminded the Commonwealth that any
burden of proving final destination [as opposed to delivery site]
rests with the taxpayer; the Commonwealth may presume Penn-
sylvania deliveries are Pennsylvania sales for CNI purposes until
successfully rebutted by the taxpayer. 8
Judge Smith authored a dissenting opinion in this case.6" She
continued to express the importance of finding a violation of the
legislative intent of a statute before interfering with the Depart-
ment's authority to issue regulations like that at issue in this
case.70 Judge Smith still found the Minnesota precedent to be un-
controlling, and she refused to weigh the implications of the
UDITPA since Pennsylvania has not adopted the act.7' Finally,
Judge Smith weighed how easily a delivery point can be defined
against the ease of determing the ultimate destination of a pur-
chaser. 2
The Department of Revenue appealed to the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court. 3 Justice Castille, writing the opinion of the court,
began by stating the standard of review when interpreting a stat-
ute.74  Statutory interpretation in Pennsylvania, according to
Justice Castille, requires analyzing the legislative intention, the
best indication of which is found in the plain language of the stat-
ute.75  The plain language of the Tax Reform Code states that,
"Is]ales of tangible personal property are in this State if the prop-
erty is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, within this State re-
gardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale."76 The
majority states that if the phrase "within this State" is read to
modify the word "delivered," then the legislation intended to util-
ize a delivery test, and dock sales would be taxable for corporate
net income tax purposes in the state of delivery.77 However, if the
67. Id.
68. Gilmour H, 750 A.2d at 953-54. This is the same result that the Minnesota court
observed in Olympia. Olympia, 326 N.W.2d at 647-48.
69. Gilmour 11, 750 A.2d at 954. Judge Flaherty joined in Judge Smith's dissent. Id. at
956.
70. Id. at 954-55.
71. Id. at 955-56.
72. Id. at 956.
73. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 679.
74. Id.
75. Id. See, e.g., Bowser v. Blom, 807 A.2d 830, 835 (Pa. 2002).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(16) (West 1971) (emphasis added).
77. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 678.
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phrase "within this State" is read to modify the word "purchaser,"
then a destination test is more appropriate, and dock sales are not
taxable in the state of delivery but in the resident state of the pur-
chaser.78 As a result, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that
the plain language of the statute does not result in one interpreta-
tion.79
The majority next observed that Pennsylvania construes the
language of the statute in accordance with the rules of grammar
and those of common usage, giving effect to all provisions such
that no provision is superfluous." If the legislature intended a
delivery test to be used, the final phrase of the statute regarding
the f.o.b. points would be unnecessary.8' Justice Castille noted
that the placement of the comma before the phrase "within this
State" does not easily lead to the conclusion that the phrase modi-
fies the word "delivered," reasoning that the comma could easily
have been removed and the phrase repeated to implement a deliv-
ery test.8' However, the majority determined that rewording the
statute would have departed from the language of the UDITPA,
which the statute was clearly designed to imitate.83
Finally, Justice Castille observed that all tax statutes are to be
narrowly construed.' In order to achieve this goal, the ambiguity
of the statute must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. In Gil-
mour Manufacturing's case, the majority established that this re-
quired interpreting the language of the Tax Reform Code as im-
posing a destination test as opposed to a delivery test, thus lower-
ing the taxpayer's sales factor in the apportionment ratio.85
Justice Castille recognized that administrative interpretations
of a complex statute are entitled to some weight by the courts.
8 6
However, in order for that deference to exist, the regulation must
follow the meaning of the statute without violating the intent of
the legislature. Although the Treasury issued the regulation in
an attempt to interpret the Tax Reform Code, the majority deter-
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 679. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1903, 1921(a) (2003).
81. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 681.
82. Id. at 681-82.
83. Id. at 682.
84. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928(b)(3) (2003).
85. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 682.




mined that the regulation was inconsistent with the intent of the
legislature.88 Therefore, they could not uphold the regulation.89
In addition to Florida and Minnesota, Gilmour Manufacturing
relied heavily upon the jurisprudence of four other states. ° All six
of these states have statutes with very similar language to that of
Pennsylvania's statute, and Gilmour Manufacturing argued that
each of those states has interpreted their respective statutes as
Gilmour contended Pennsylvania's statute should be read: dock
sales should be excluded from the numerator of the sales factor
when computing the appropriate apportionment for corporate net
income tax." The court found these arguments equally persua-
sive."
Justice Castille agreed with the en banc court that the construc-
tion of the statute leads to the conclusion that the phrase "within
this State" must modify "purchaser," and only sales to Pennsyl-
vania purchasers should be included in the numerator of the sales
factor of the apportionment ratio for CNI tax purposes."
Although the right to tax is a power reserved to the states in the
United States Constitution, there are several provisions which
limit that power." The first limitation arises from the Commerce
Clause.99 Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate inter-
state commerce. 96 A state tax giving preference to in-state taxpay-
ers will be found unconstitutional if it interferes with interstate
commerce. While each state is entitled to impose an income tax
on companies transacting business in interstate commerce, no
state may tax a multi-state company on its entire income from
everywhere."
88. Id. at 684.
89. Id.
90. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 680. The four other states are California, Connecticut, Ken-
tucky, and Wisconsin. Id. These states have derived the language of their statutes from
the UDITPA_ Id. at 681.
91. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 680.
92. Id. at 682.
93. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 681. The majority also admitted that the court must construe
the taxing statute in favor of the taxpayer. Id. at 682. "Since we must apply the rules of
grammar and since we must construe the taxing statute in favor of the taxpayer, then
Gilmour must, perforce, prevail." Id.
94. 4-79 Business Organizations with Tax Planning §79.02. See U.S. CONST. amend. X;
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
95. 4-79 Business Organizations with Tax Planning §79.02.
96. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
97. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 459 (1959).
98. Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1931).
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The state taxation power over interstate transactions began
with Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor.99 Spector Motor Service
was a Missouri corporation engaged solely in interstate truck-
ing.1"' The Supreme Court held that the Connecticut tax on the
"privilege" of doing business levied on a company that was solely
engaged in interstate activity was invalid.1°'
Louisiana confused the rule in Spector in deciding the cases of
Colonial Pipeline Company v. Mouton and Colonial Pipeline Com-
pany v. Traigle. °2 The state statute originally taxed corporations
on the "privilege of doing business."' 3 When the tax was found to
be unconstitutional,' °' Louisiana changed the language of its stat-
ute to impose a tax on the "qualification to carry on or do business
in this state or the actual doing of business."' 5 The United States
Supreme Court upheld the updated language from Traigle in
1975.106 The question left unanswered by the Colonial Pipeline
series of cases is the difference between a tax imposed on the
"privilege of doing business," from a tax imposed on the "qualifica-
tion to carry on or do business in this state or the actual doing of
business."'0'
The Supreme Court resolved this problematic distinction in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.' s Complete Auto, a Michi-
gan corporation, was in the business of transporting motor vehi-
cles for General Motors Corporation. 109 Mississippi taxed Com-
plete Auto on its sales in Mississippi, based on the privilege of do-
ing business in Mississippi."0 Complete Auto, relying on the Spec-
99. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
100. Spector, 340 U.S. at 603.
101. Id. at 609-10.
102. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Mouton, 228 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 231 So. 2d 393 (La. 1970); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
103. Colonial (Mouton), 228 So. 2d at 720.
104. Id. at 723.
105. Colonial (Traigle), 421 U.S. at 104 n.4.
106. Id. at 114.
107. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
108. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
109. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 276.
110. Id. at 277. The relevant statute in effect at the time of this case states:
There is hereby levied and assessed and shall be collected, privilege taxes for the
privilege of engaging or continuing in business or doing business within this state to
be determined by the application of rates against gross proceeds of sales or gross in-
come or values, as the case may be, as provided in the following sections.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 10105 (Supp. 1972), as amended. Another relevant Mississippi statute
states:
Upon every person operating a pipeline, railroad, airplane, bus, truck, or any other
transportation business for the transportation of persons or property for compensa-
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tor rule, argued that its business was part of interstate commerce,
making the Mississippi tax imposed on Complete Auto an uncon-
stitutional use of Mississippi's taxing power."'
The Supreme Court overruled Spector."' While the Court rec-
ognized the reality that any tailored tax may result in discrimina-
tion against businesses engaged in interstate commerce, it found
no solid reason to find that a tax on "the privilege of doing busi-
ness" is per se unconstitutional."3 The four-factor test that Com-
plete Auto established to determine whether a tax on the privilege
of doing business is unconstitutional is as follows: (1) the tax is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
State; (2) the tax is fairly apportioned; (3) the tax does not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce; and (4) the tax is fairly
related to the services provided by the State.
1 4
Multiple taxation may result from the decision that a tax on the
privilege of doing business within a state is constitutional."5 The
Complete Auto test allows states to create their own apportion-
ment formulas for taxation on the privilege of doing business.
Where two states differ on their approach to apportioning corpo-
rate net income and both are constitutionally valid, neither state
must alter its approach to eliminate the double taxation."7
The second constitutional limitation placed on taxation turns on
the Due Process Clause."' Due process requires that a state pro-
vide the taxpayer with benefits before asking for a tax payment in
return."9 Two specific issues arise when determining if there is a
sufficient nexus between the tax imposed and the business activity
taxed: "(1) whether the corporation's activities constitute an ade-
tion or hire between points within this State, there is hereby levied, assessed, and
shall be collected, a tax equal to five per cent of the gross income of such business....
MISS. CODE ANN. § 10109(2) (Supp. 1972), as amended.
111. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
112. Id. at 288-89.
113. Id at 289.
114. Id. at 287. See e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440 (1964);
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461 (1959); Mem-
phis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 87 (1948); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435,
444-45 (1940).
115. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 445 (1980). In Mobil,
the New York taxpayer was trying to argue that dividends taxable in New York should
have been allocated to New York as opposed to apportioned between the states because of
the double taxation. Id. at 430.
116. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 280.
117. Mobil, 445 U.S. at 444-45.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
119. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. at 444.
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quate basis for taxation, and (2) whether the method of taxation is
reasonably related to the activities conducted."2 '
In 1957, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
(UDITPA) was promulgated.'' The purpose of this act was to pro-
vide uniformity among the different states in taxing multi-state
corporations. 12' The UDITPA addresses many of the issues at
hand in Gilmour.' Section 1 begins by defining business in-
come.124  Section 2 allows the allocation and apportionment of
business income where a taxpayer has a multi-state business.2 5
The UDITPA introduces the three factor apportionment ratio in
Section 9, the sales factor of which is defined in Section 15.126
Most importantly, Section 16 illustrates the Act's definition of in-
state sales of tangible personal property.'27 However, it is the
120. 4-79 Business Organizations with Tax Planning § 79.02[2]. See e.g., Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n,
390 U.S. 317 (1968); Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. North Carolina, 297 U.S. 657 (1936);
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S.
32(1920).
121. 8 A.L.R. 4th 934, at § 2 (1981).
122. Id. Otherwise, multi-state corporations would run the risk of being subject to sev-
eral tax liabilities on the same income. Id.
123. See generally Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act §§ 1-3, 9, 15-16.
124. Uniform Division of Income Tax Purposes Act § 1(a). The UDITPA definition reads:
Income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's
trade or business and includes income from tangible and intangible property if the
acquisition, management, and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of
the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations.
Id. (emphasis added). Compare with Pennsylvania's definition:
Income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's
trade or business and includes income from tangible and intangible property if either
the acquisition, the management or the disposition of the property constitutes an inte-
gral part of the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(1)(A) (West 1971) (emphasis added).
125. Uniform Division of Income Tax Purposes Act § 2. The UDITPA states:
Any taxpayer having income from business activity which is taxable both within and
without this state, other than activity as a financial organization or public utility or
the rendering of purely personal services by an individual, shall allocate and appor-
tion his net income as provided in this Act (emphasis added).
Id. Compare with Pennsylvania's language:
Any taxpayer having income from business activity which is taxable both within and
without this State other than activity as a corporation whose allocation and appor-
tionment of income is specifically provided for in section 401(3)2(b), (c) and (d) shall
allocate and apportion taxable income as provided in this definition (emphasis
added).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(2) (West 1971).
126. Uniform Division of Income Tax Purposes Act §§ 9, 15. Section 9 illustrates a three
factor test including equally weighted property, payroll, and sales factors. Id.
127. Uniform Division of Income Tax Purposes Act § 16. The UDITPA specifically de-
fines sales of tangible personal property as being in this state if: "the property is delivered
or shipped to a purchaser... within this state regardless of the f.o.b. point or other condi-
tions of the sale; or the property is shipped from an office.., in this state and [either] the
933
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Comments to Section 16 that provide guidance as to the Confer-
ence's intention relating to the definition of in-state sales.'28 The
first comment following the text of Section 16 includes as in-state
sales those sales that a purchaser directs to be delivered to an in-
state "ultimate recipient."'29 The next comment specifically ex-
empts sales to the U.S. government on the basis that ultimate des-
tination would be very difficult to determine.3 ' It is clear that the
drafters were concerned with the destination of goods as opposed
to the location of delivery when defining in-state sales.' One fi-
nal particular feature of the UDITPA concerning the sales factor
is known as the "throwback rule."'32 The throwback rule requires
a corporation to include in the numerator of its sales factor any
sales attributable to states in which the corporation is not tax-
able. 33
The UDITPA has been adopted by twenty-three states. Al-
though Pennsylvania has not specifically adopted the UDITPA,
the Pennsylvania statute is worded similarly to the Uniform Act.1 39
The Pennsylvania courts throughout Gilmour's case repeatedly
analyzed the statutes of several other states whose language par-
alleled that of the UDITPA.
136
The first state analyzed by the Commonwealth Court was the
Florida Court of Appeal's decision in Parker.'37 The Florida appor-
tionment statute defined sales as in-state sales if "the property is
delivered or shipped to a purchaser within this state, regardless of
the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale."'38 The Florida De-
purchaser is the United States government or the taxpayer is not taxable in the state of the
purchaser." Id.
128. See generally Uniform Division of Income Tax Purposes Act § 16, Comments. The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the UDITPA. See
generally Uniform Division of Income Tax Purposes Act.
129. Uniform Division of Income Tax Purposes Act § 16, Comment.
130. Id.
131. See Uniform Division of Income Tax Purposes Act § 16, Comment.
132. Uniform Division of Income Tax Purposes Act § 16(b)(2).
133. Id.
134. 8 A.L.R. 4th 934 (1981).
135. Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 681. See also Gilmour, 822 A.2d at 681 n.4.
136. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gilmour Mfg. Co., 717 A.2d 619, 621-22 (Pa.
Cmwlth. Ct. 1998); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gilmour Mfg. Co., 750 A.2d 948, 951
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gilmour Mfg. Co., 822 A.2d 676,
680 (Pa. 2003).
137. Gilmour 1, 717 A.2d at 621.
138. FLA. STAT. ch. 214.71 (1979). In 2002, the Florida statutes were changed to say:
"Sales of tangible personal property occur in this state if the property is delivered or
shipped to a purchaser within this state, regardless of the f.o.b. point, other conditions of
934 Vol. 42
Commw. v. Gilmour Mfg. Co.
partment of Revenue did not argue that all of Parker's dock sales
were in-state sales; the Department agreed that purchases picked
up at Parker's location via common carrier were properly charac-
terized as out-of-state sales.'39 The Florida Department of Reve-
nue further argued that the phrase "within this state" only modi-
fied the word "delivered," as opposed to both "delivered" and
"shipped."14
Judge Danahy, writing for the Florida Court of Appeals, found
the Department of Revenue's arguments unpersuasive."' Judge
Danahy interpreted the legislative intent of the statute to require
the taxation of sales made in the Florida market, determined by
the destination of the goods, as opposed to the location of the pur-
chaser."' This legislative intent required that the phrase "within
this state" modify the term "purchaser" in the statute.4  Addi-
tionally, the court found that the Department's explanation that
the phrase must modify "delivered" but not "shipped" had no
merit. 14 Finally, the Florida legislature specifically adopted the
apportionment provision because it looked to a "destination"
test. 
145
Acting Chief Judge Ott authored the dissenting opinion in
Parker.14 The Acting Chief Judge distinguished this case further
by presenting the fact that every customer had to pick up the ba-
nanas from the Tampa dock.147 The only distinguishing factor that
exists is whether the purchaser picked up his bananas with his
the sale, or ultimate destination of the property, unless shipment is made via a common or
contract carrier." FLA. STAT. ch. 220.15(5)(b)(1) (2002) (emphasis added).
139. Parker, 391 So. 2d at 762-63. The Department of Revenue grounds this position by
looking to a delivery test. Id. at 763. By law, all sales but those made by common carrier
are delivered in Tampa. Id. However, delivery does not occur for sales transported by
common carrier until reaching the purchaser's location. Id.




144. Parker, 391 So. 2d at 763. Judge Danahy acknowledges the Department's concern:
to interpret the phrase as modifying both words would exempt from taxation a large por-
tion of tax revenue from sales made by out-of-state seller to in-state purchasers. Id. How-
ever, the Department's interpretation was found to be clearly inconsistent with the rules of
grammar. Id.
145. See Gilmour 1, 717 A.2d at 621. Under the destination test described in Parker, the
ultimate destination of the goods, or the market in which the goods are sold, controls the
taxability of the sale, regardless of the physical location of the purchaser himself. Parker,
391 So. 2d at 763-64.




own truck, or rather if he received his fruit via common carrier. 14s
Moreover, because of the vast clientele purchasing bananas,
Parker could not know with any certainty the plans for the fruit
once it left its hands, meaning that Parker could not know the fi-
nal destination for every sale made. 149 According to Acting Chief
Judge Ott, the destination system proposed by Judge Danahy
turns to an "honor system," which will inevitably result in lost tax
revenue to the Department from simple strategic business plan-
ning on the part of corporations doing business in Florida."'
The court in Gilmour next cited Olympia Brewing Co. v. Com-
missioner of Revenue.'51 Olympia Brewing excluded all out-of-state
sales from its apportionment ratio for the taxable year."' The
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue agreed that sales delivered
via rail or common carrier were properly excludable from in-state
sales, but the Commissioner included sales where the beer was
picked up by the purchaser's own trucks."3 The Minnesota statute
regarding in-state sales for apportionment purposes reads: "Sales
of tangible personal property are made within this state if the
property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser within this state,
and the taxpayer is taxable in this state, regardless of the f.o.b.
point or other conditions of the sale.""4
Olympia set forth several arguments for interpreting Minne-
sota's statute in its favor."' First, looking at the legislative his-
tory, Minnesota rejected its previous "office test.""' Additionally,
Olympia contended that it was easy for taxpayers to avoid appor-
tionment based on the "office test.""7 Tax avoidance is no longer a
problem, as very few purchasers will move their business location
solely to benefit a seller."8 Olympia also pointed out that other
states use a destination test, and as a result, it is disadvantageous
148. Id. This fact shows more clearly why the Department made such a distinction in its
argument between sales delivered via corporate truck and those made via common carrier.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 767. Acting Chief Judge Ott also refers to the difficulty in enforcing such a
system. Id.
151. Gilmour 1, 717 A.2d at 622.
152. Olympia, 326 N.W.2d at 644.
153. Id. This is the same treatment applied in Florida. See Parker, 391 So. 2d at 762-
63.
154. MINN. STAT. § 290.19 subd. la (1980).
155. Olympia, 326 N.W.2d at 644-46.
156. Id. at 645. Minnesota's "office test" was called such because Minnesota allocated
sales to states based on the location of the purchaser's office. Id.
157. Olympia, 326 N.W.2d at 645. The "office test" not only inquired into the pur-
chaser's location but also into marketing and shipping practices of the purchaser. Id.
158. Olympia, 326 N.W.2d at 645.
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for a business to locate in Minnesota, as a sale could be taxed
twice by combining one state's destination test with Minnesota's
delivery test.5 9 Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court then com-
pared Minnesota's statute with the language and intent of the
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). °
Judge Simonett both refused to support a delivery test,' and to
implement a test that produces different results depending on the
mode of transportation that is used.'62 Finally, the majority re-
minded the parties that the burden of proving destination is on
the taxpayer; if the taxpayer cannot support its computed sales
factor, then the Commissioner's determination will stand.
6 3
California contended with the same issue in McDonnell Douglas
Corporation v. Franchise Tax Board." In McDonnell, McDonnell
Douglas Corporation ("MDC") delivered aircraft to purchasers in
California, who then arranged for transportation to the pur-
chaser's ultimate location.'65 The California statute regarding in-
state sales reads:
Sales of tangible personal property are in this state if: (a)
The property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other
than the United States government, within this state re-
gardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale;
or (b) The property is shipped from an office, store, ware-
house, factory, or other place of storage in this state and
(1) the purchaser is the United States government or (2)
the taxpayer is not taxable in the state of the purchaser.'66
This was also a case of first impression in California.'67 In
addition to relying on the opinions of other jurisdictions, the
California Court of Appeals recognized that the State Board
of Equalization had previously ruled that "[s]ales of tangible
159. Id.
160. Id. at 646. See discussion on UDITPA supra notes 121-136 and accompanying text.
161. Id. at 647.
162. Id. If the Commissioner's argument were to stand, the apportionment would in-
clude sales picked up by the purchaser's own trucks, but the apportionment would not
include sales picked up by the purchaser via common carrier. Id. The Minnesota court
finds this distinction incredible. Id.
163. 'Olympia, 326 N.W.2d at 647-48.
164. 26 Cal. App. 4th 1789, 1792 (1994).
165. McDonnell, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1791.
166. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25135 (West 2003) (emphasis added).
167. McDonnell, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1793.
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personal property are ordinarily assigned to the state of the des-
tination of the goods."'68 California also examined the purpose of
the UDITPA, which is uniformity of taxation among the states.
169
Following this reasoning, California elected to interpret its statute
as a destination statute, negating the regulation in question.
Wisconsin dealt with the issue of dock sales in Pabst Brewing
Company v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue.70 Pabst Brewing
Company sold beer to out-of-state wholesalers, who chose to pick
up the beer at Pabst's location in Milwaukee.17" ' In a brief opinion
authored by Judge Gartzke, the majority of the Court of Appeals
of Wisconsin found the Wisconsin statute to be ambiguous.' Spe-
cifically, the majority found that the phrase "regardless of the
f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale" required an interpreta-
tion favoring a destination test.'73 Judge Dykman, in his dissent,
relies heavily on the rule in Wisconsin that the interpretation of a
statute by a regulating agency stands above any other.'74
Kentucky faced a slightly different issue in Revenue Cabinet,
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Rohm and Haas Kentucky, Inc.
75
Rohm and Haas Kentucky was a subsidiary corporation selling its
products to its parent. 176 The parent corporation picked up prod-
ucts at the subsidiary location in Kentucky.7 7 After quoting sev-
eral lengthy passages from Parker, Olympia, Pabst, and McDon-
nell, Judge Gudgel, writing for the Court of Appeals in Kentucky,
announced that Kentucky would not follow a minority rule when
the purpose of the UDITPA was uniform taxation among the
states.
78
Connecticut also faced this issue in a case where purchasers
picked up petroleum products from a supplier in Connecticut to
take back to their home states. 79 Although Connecticut had not
168. Id. at 1796 n.4. See also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §25135 (West 2003).
169. McDonnell, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1796.
170. 387 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. App. 1986).
171. Pabst, 387 N.W.2d at 122.
172. Id. at 122. The Wisconsin statute states: "Sales of tangible personal property are
in this state if ... [t]he property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than the
federal government, within this state regardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the
sale." WIS. STAT. § 71.25(9)(b)(1) (2003). At the time of Pabst, the location of the statute
was Wis. STAT. § 71.07(2)(c)2 (2003). Pabst, 387 N.W.2d at 122.
173. Id. at 122-23.
174. Id. at 124.
175. 929 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. App. 1996).
176. Rohm, 929 S.W.2d at 742.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 743-45.
179. Texaco, Inc. v. Groppo, 574 A.2d 1293, 1294 (Conn. 1990).
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adopted the UDITPA, its statutory language was very similar to
that of the Act.180 Connecticut too followed other jurisdictions' in-
terpretations as well as resolving the matter in favor of the tax-
payer, requiring a finding that dock sales were excludable from
the sales factor in calculating the apportionment ratio. 8'
The Pennsylvania Tax Reform Code of 1971 gives the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Revenue the right to impose an excise tax on
corporate net income for the privilege of doing business in Penn-
sylvania.8 2 The Pennsylvania Department of Revenue is author-
ized to tax businesses located inside Pennsylvania as well as busi-
nesses located outside of Pennsylvania that sell their goods or ser-
vices within the state borders. 83 The Tax Reform Code allows any
company that transacts interstate business to apportion its busi-
ness income for the purposes of the corporate net income (CNI)
tax.' 8 Apportionment in Pennsylvania for CNI purposes requires
a corporation to look at a three-factor apportionment ratio. 85 Af-
180. Texaco, 574 A.2d at 1296. Connecticut's statute reads: "'[Giross earnings' are those
earnings from the sale of petroleum products to which the sales factor is applied under
subdivision (3) of section 12-218... " CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-587 (2003).
181. Texaco, 574 A.2d at 1296.
182. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7402(a) (West 1971). The Pennsylvania statutes only im-
pose this particular excise tax on corporations. Id. A corporation is defined as any of the
following:
(i) A corporation,
(ii) A joint-stock association,
(iii) A business trust, limited liability company or other entity which for Federal in-
come tax purposes is classified as a corporation.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(1) (West 1971).
183. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7402(a) (West 1971).
184. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(2) (West 1971). Apportionment involves using
a ratio of Pennsylvania activity to activity everywhere in order to limit the amount of in-
come taxed in Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit., 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(10), (13), & (15) (West
1971). Apportionment is only appropriate if the business income can be taxable in another
state, whether or not it actually is taxed in that state. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §
7401(3)2(a)(3) (West 1971). Pennsylvania distinguishes between business income, which
arises from the taxpayer's ordinary course of business, and non-business income, all other
income the business attains. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(1)(A)&(D) (West 1971).
Pennsylvania follows the United States Constitution in defining that only business income
is apportionable. Id.
185. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(9)(A) (West 1971). The three factors are a
property factor, a payroll expense factor, and a sales factor. Id. The property factor is a
fraction, the numerator of which is the average of all Pennsylvania real and tangible prop-
erty owned, rented, or used during the taxable year, and the denominator of which is the
total average real and tangible property owned, rented, or used during the taxable year
everywhere. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(10) (West 1971). The payroll factor is a
fraction, the numerator of which represents the total compensation paid out by the corpora-
tion to employees located in Pennsylvania, and the denominator of which is the total com-
pensation paid out by the corporation to employees located everywhere. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, § 7401(3)2(a)(13) (West 1971). The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which
equals the total number of dollar sales made in Pennsylvania, and the denominator of
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ter calculating the apportionment ratio, the company multiplies
the ratio by its business income. 186 The foregoing results in Penn-
sylvania taxable income.'
Pennsylvania began using a "cousin" of the UDITPA's "throw-
back rule," known as the "throw-out rule."'88 The "throw-out" rule,
rather than increasing the numerator of the sales factor, de-
creased the denominator by those sales attributable to states that
either did not tax those sales or had no jurisdictional power over a
business to tax such sales.189 Pennsylvania found authority for
this rule under Section 7401(3)2(a)(18), which allows the Secre-
tary of Revenue to employ a different method of apportionment
where the standard three factor ratio does not fairly and equitably
apportion income. 90
The "throw-out rule" was heavily debated in Hellertown Manu-
facturing Company v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania9 ' and Paris
Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.192 In
Hellertown, a Delaware corporation with all of its assets and pay-
roll in Pennsylvania was forced to throw out sales made to states
which did not have jurisdiction to tax such sales.9 Paris Manu-
facturing was also a corporation holding all of its assets and pay-
roll in Pennsylvania.'94 In Paris, the Department of Revenue at-
tempted to throw out certain out-of-state sales, based on the same
rationale as applied in Hellertown."9 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court overruled Hellertown, stating that the legislative intent be-
hind apportionment was to tax income earned within Pennsyl-
which equals the total number of dollar sales made everywhere. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §
7401(3)2(a)(15) (West 1971). In this case, only the sales factor was an issue. Gilmour, 822
A.2d at 677.
186. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(9)(A) (West 1971).
187. See Pennsylvania form PA RCT-101 Page 3, Line 11.
188. Hellertown Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 390 A.2d 732, 734 (Pa.
1978).
189. Id. See also Beistle Co. v. Commonwealth, 640 A.2d 483, 487 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994) (citing 61 Pa. Code § 153.43(b)). Please note that § 153.43 has since been amended to
exclude this subsection. See 61 PA. CODE § 153.43.
190. Id. at 733.
191. 390 A.2d 732 (Pa. 1978).
192. 476 A.2d 890 (Pa. 1984).
193. Hellertown, 390 A.2d at 735. The significance of Hellertown maintaining all of its
assets and payroll in Pennsylvania was that it resulted in Hellertown's property and pay-
roll factors each totaling 100 percent. Id. at 733. The Department of Revenue argued that
the low one percent sales factor compared to the two other factors did not properly repre-
sent Hellertown's business activity in Pennsylvania. Id.
194. Paris, 476 A.2d at 890.
195. Id. at 891-92.
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vania.'96 Whether another state chooses to similarly tax sales in
those states is irrelevant for Pennsylvania tax purposes.
197
Most states that impose an income tax maintain rules for appor-
tionment of that income for multi-state businesses.9" Pennsyl-
vania, like many other states, chooses to weight its sales factor in
relation to the other two factors.'99 Additionally, not every state
taxes income at the same tax rate.2 °0 Pennsylvania taxes corpo-
rate net income at the highest rate among the states: 9.99%.201
Combining the high tax rate with the triple-weighted sales factor
makes it advantageous for a company doing business in Pennsyl-
vania to keep its sales outside of the state. By removing dock
sales from the apportionment factor, a business liable for corpo-
196. Id.
197. Id. at 893.
198. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. § 10-402(c) (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 63, §
38(c) (1932); N.Y. TAX LAW § 210 (consol. 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.05 (West
2003); W. VA. CODE § 11-24-7 (1931).
199. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(9)(A) (West 1971). Arizona, Florida, Georgia,
Maryland, New York, and West Virginia all double weight their sales factors when calculat-
ing their income apportionment ratios. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 43-1139 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch.
220.15 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-31 (1981); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-402(c)
(1957); N.Y. TAX LAW § 210 (consol. 2002); W.VA. CODE § 11-24-7 (1931). Pennsylvania
triple weights its sales factor, as does Ohio. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(9)(A)
(West 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.05 (West 2003). Therefore, the Pennsylvania
apportionment fraction looks like: (1 Property + 1 Payroll + 3 Sales)/5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, § 7401(3)2(a)(9)(A) (West 1971).
200. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23151 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 220.11 (2003);
IND. CODE § 6-3-2-1 (2003); N.J. REV. STAT. § 54:10A-5 (1945).
201. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7402(b) (West 1971). Alaska and West Virginia tax income
at similar rates, at 9.4% and 9.0%, respectively. ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.011 (1981); W.VA.
CODE § 11-24-4 (1988). Colorado, Florida, Illinois, and Indiana all tax income at less than
6%. COL. REV. STAT. § 39-22-301(1)(d) (2000); FLA. STAT. ch. 220.11 (2003); ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/201 (2003); IND. CODE § 6-3-2-1 (2003).
202. It has been proposed that for the tax years beginning in 2003 that the sales factor
represent 80 percent of the apportionment factor. House Bill No. 334 (2003). For tax years
after 2003, the sales factor would be the only factor used in apportioning income. Id.
For example, assume a taxpayer corporation that has $100,000 of business income,
$50,000 of assets, $50,000 of payroll, and $200,000 of total sales ($100,000 of which are to
Florida customers). All assets and payroll are located in Pennsylvania. The corporation
sells to customers in Florida, which taxes corporate net income at a rate of 5.5%. FLA.
STAT. ch. 220.11 (2003). Florida only double weights its sales factor. FLA. STAT. ch. 220.15
(2002). If the corporation allows the Florida purchaser to pick up the sales at the Pennsyl-
vania location, under the Department's interpretation of the Pennsylvania statute, the
seller's apportionment factor for Pennsylvania corporate net income tax purposes would be
100%. All $100,000 of business income would be allocated to Pennsylvania, and the seller
would be have a tax liability of $9,990. However, if the Pennsylvania seller either delivers
to the Florida location or excludes the dock sales from the sales factor (the result in Gil-
mour), then the Pennsylvania apportionment ratio is 3.5/5 = 70%, leading to a Pennsyl-
vania tax liability of $6,993. The Florida apportionment ratio is = 25%, leading to a
Florida tax liability of $1,375. The total tax liability is $8,368, which is $1,622 less than if
all of the sales are attributable to Pennsylvania.
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rate net income tax in Pennsylvania can take advantage of the
opportunity of an out-of-state purchaser taking responsibility for
the transportation of the sold property without incurring addi-
tional liability.
The destination test adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Gilmour follows this logic. As mentioned in a few of the
opinions analyzed by the Pennsylvania courts, mode of delivery
does not make sense as a determining factor as to where a sale
occurs for income taxation purposes. A taxpayer in Pennsylvania
would never allow a purchaser to pick up sold merchandise at its
dock if it would incur a greater tax liability in doing so. Also,
shipping expenses are fully deductible for both federal and Penn-
sylvania income tax purposes. By refusing out-of-state treatment
of dock sales, Pennsylvania is encouraging Pennsylvania busi-
nesses to incur more expenses, leading to tax deductions, as op-
posed to increased tax revenue. This result is clearly in opposition
to that which the state should strive to reach.
One can certainly appreciate the arguments raised by the De-
partment of Revenue. The Department also collects sales and use
taxes on "each separate sale at retail of tangible personal property
and specified services within Pennsylvania."2 °3 Sales tax is as-
sessed based on a delivery test.2 ' From a strictly logical point of
view, it is difficult to reconcile the theory that a sale can occur in
Pennsylvania and outside of Pennsylvania at the same time.20 5 It
would appear that treating dock sales as in-state sales would be
consistent with the sales and use tax.
Similarly, the Pennsylvania courts do not really address the fact
that the Pennsylvania statute includes a comma before the phrase
"within this State."2 6 Several of the states upon which the Penn-
sylvania courts so heavily relied were interpreting statutes that
did not include this comma.20 ' The UDITPA language, as well as
the remaining states upon which the court relied, uses the comma
203. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7202(a) (West 1971).
204. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7201(b) (West 1971). The sales tax is imposed on sellers
who maintain a business in Pennsylvania. Id. The Pennsylvania statute states that main-
taining a business in Pennsylvania includes making delivery within the state. Id.
205. This is precisely the case of a dock sale. Delivery occurs within Pennsylvania, in-
curring a sales tax liability. However, according to Gilmour, the sale is not includible in
the sales factor for corporate net income tax purposes.
206. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)2(a)(16) (West 1971).
207. See Texaco, 574 A.2d at 1294-95; Olympia, 326 N.W.2d at 644; Parker, 391 So. 2d at
762.
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to enclose a phrase.0 8 Pennsylvania is not enclosing a phrase, so
the use of the comma is not consistent with that of the UDITPA or
the other states. The Pennsylvania courts' reliance on the inter-
pretations of other states' statutes, which are grammatically dif-
ferent from that of Pennsylvania's, appears misguided.
Still, despite the inconsistency of the grammar, the language of
the Pennsylvania statute clearly resembles that of the UDITPA.
It appears that the legislative intent was for Pennsylvania to fol-
low the same guidance as promulgated in the Uniform Act. The
UDITPA encourages uniform treatment of taxation among the
states. Following the guidance of six other jurisdictions undoubt-
edly achieves that uniform goal. Furthermore, after Gilmour paid
the computed settled tax, the Department proposed an amend-
ment to regulation 153.24.209 The amendment would have changed
the requirement that dock sales be included in the sales factor for
purposes of corporate net income tax apportionment. 2 ' This spe-
cifically shows that the legislative intent relating to dock sales
was to exclude such sales in the numerator of the sales factor in
computing corporate net income tax liability in Pennsylvania.
The question raised before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Gilmour was a difficult one. Arguments for both sides can be
made. However, one thing is clear: If the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court misinterpreted the legislative intent when deciding the
Gilmour case, it is up to the Pennsylvania legislature to make that
fact known by enacting new legislation, more clearly understood,
for guidance.
Karen Oehling
208. Uniform Division of Income Tax Purposes Act § 16(a). See also McDonnell, 26 Cal.
App. 4th at 1793; Pabst, 387 N.W.2d at 122; Rohm, 929 S.W.2d at 742.
209. Gilmour 1, 717 A.2d at 619.
210. Id.
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